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Abstract 
This study is the second in a series funded by the Chief of Naval Personnel to 
address low retention of officers in the Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) community. 
Low junior officer retention is a concern, particularly with respect to SWO women—
whose numbers have steadily declined since the repeal of the Combat Exclusion Act 
in 1994.  
Studies conducted in this area have found that family-related factors, as well 
as leadership and culture factors (including morale and lack of mentoring), push both 
men and women out of the Navy. Nonetheless, the Navy’s primary effort to improve 
retention has been to introduce the Surface Warfare Officer Continuation Pay 
(SWOCP) in 1994 and, subsequently, to offer a Critical Skills Retention Bonus. 
Retention bonuses have not offset the non-monetary concerns, particularly for 
women. The present study focuses on the non-monetary factors that have received 
little attention in the past with respect to changes that could be made to improve 
retention.  The findings apply to both men and women.  
Unlike previous studies that have assessed intentions of SWOs to stay or 
leave, the current study is based on a survey of officers who have actually made the 
decision to leave active duty and who are now in the Individual Ready Reserve 
(IRR). 
The data show that family-related factors are the highest-rated influences on 
the decision to leave active duty; this holds true for both men and women and older 
vs. younger year groups. Women felt more strongly than men about the influence 
some of these factors had on the decision to leave active duty, but the similarity 
between the opinions expressed by men and women was surprising. Further, 
monetary incentives have less influence on retention than family or leadership 
factors. “Total military pay” was more important to men than to women, but still 
placed lower on the list than many other factors that caused men to leave active 
duty.  
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Other findings are reported that concern mentoring, gender issues, feelings 
about the separation decision, and incentives that could encourage this group to 
consider returning to active duty. More women than men would consider returning, 
and improvements in leadership were mentioned most often by all groups as a 
change that needs to be made to improve retention. Finally, recommendations are 
made for training interventions and research to address leadership issues. 
Keywords: Surface Warfare Officer (SWO), retention, Individual Ready 
Reserve (IRR)
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Executive Summary 
This study is the second in a series funded by the Chief of Naval Personnel to 
address low retention of officers in the Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) community. Low 
junior officer retention is a concern, particularly with respect to SWO women—whose 
numbers have steadily declined since the repeal of the Combat Exclusion Act in 1994.  
Studies conducted in this area have found that there are family-related factors, 
as well as leadership and culture factors (including morale and lack of mentoring), that 
push both men and women out of the Navy. Nonetheless, the Navy’s primary effort to 
improve retention has been to introduce the Surface Warfare Officer Continuation Pay 
(SWOCP) in 1994 and, subsequently, to offer a Critical Skills Retention Bonus. 
Retention bonuses have not offset the non-monetary concerns, particularly for women. 
The present study focuses on the non-monetary factors that have received little 
attention in the past with respect to changes that could be made to improve retention. 
The findings apply to both men and women.  
Unlike previous studies that have assessed intentions of SWOs to stay or leave, 
the current study is based on a survey of officers who have actually made the decision 
to leave active duty and who are now in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). During the 
summer of 2006, Navy Personnel Command (NPC) (PERS-93)—formerly Naval 
Reserve Personnel Center—conducted a mandatory muster of select IRR members, 
both officers and enlisted. SWO personnel in the IRR were included. The Naval 
Postgraduate School, thanks to the support and cooperation from NPC (PERS-93), was 
able to include a retention survey in the package for all mustering SWOs to receive, 
complete, and return. 
The IRR officers who took this survey represent year groups from 1983 to 2005. 
The officers in year groups prior to Year Group 1994 (YG94) did not have the option of 
taking the SWOCP in exchange for a commitment to stay through two Department Head 
tours, which might have meant their decision-making process was significantly different 
than those in later year groups.  In recognition of the fact that SWOs in YG94 and later 
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had a different retention decision-making environment than those in YG93 and earlier, 
the survey analysis in this report separates the respondents into two different year 
group categories—those in YG93 and Earlier and those in YG94 and Later. All 
responses are also analyzed by gender. Of the total 551 respondents, 65 percent were 
in YG94 and Later (70 percent of that group were men), and 35 percent were in YG93 
and Earlier (93 percent were men, which meant that the number of women was so 
small—10—that in most cases the Earlier women’s data were not analyzed). 
The demographics of the two year groupings at the time of the IRR muster 
differed in many ways. The men in YG93 and Earlier are older, more senior, stayed on 
active duty longer than the Later group, and fewer of them chose the IRR to avoid the 
risk of being recalled.  More of these men are married with dependent children and have 
unemployed spouses.  Thus, we would expect their separation decisions to be different 
from the men and women in YG94 and later. We would also expect to be more 
interested in the perspectives of the younger group in that their experiences and 
perceptions should be more representative of the current environment for junior SWO 
officers. Oddly enough, however, the data actually show more similarities than 
differences between the two groups.   
Findings 
1. Family-related factors are the highest-rated influences on decision to 
leave active duty; this holds true for both men and women and older vs. 
younger year groups. Women felt more strongly than men about the 
influence some of these factors had on the decision to leave active duty. 
This supports data gathered in other studies based on intentions to leave 
or stay.  
2. Leadership and culture issues have a strong influence on retention and 
probably cannot be offset by monetary incentives in most cases.  
3. Monetary incentives have less influence on retention than family or 
leadership factors. “Total military pay” was more important to men than to 
women, but still placed lower on the list than many other factors that 
caused men to leave active duty.  
4. Mentoring is a positive retention factor for both men and women. 
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5. Discrimination against women—sometimes subtle and sometimes not-so-
subtle—and other complex gender issues still exist and can affect 
retention. 
6. The majority of respondents do not regret the decision to leave active 
duty, but more women than men might consider returning to active duty.  
7. Changes in the Navy concerning family and leadership issues are seen as 
incentives to return to active duty; monetary factors are less influential.  
For example, the highest-rated factor—overall time spent away from 
home—was answered “Yes, I would consider returning if there were 
improvements…” by 17 percent of the men and 28 percent of the women.  
When including “Maybe” responses, the number who might consider 
returning jumped to 37 percent for men and 52 percent for women.  The 
second-highest item for women was changes to SWO leadership; 25 
percent of the women said “Yes” they would consider returning if 
leadership changed, with a jump to 40 percent when the “Maybe” answers 
were included.  These are sizeable proportions of the groups! 
8. The fact that a proportion of IRR members can identify changes that would 
make them consider returning to active duty is a positive finding for the 
community as senior leadership considers retention issues for active duty 
SWO officers.  
9. When respondents were asked, “What ONE thing should be done to 
improve SWO retention?”, leadership (which includes items related to 
morale and culture) was the top-rated response for YG94 and Later men 
(36%) and women (49%) and YG93 and Earlier men (46%). 
10. While it is not clear why we have put so much emphasis on monetary 
incentives for retention to-date while excluding most other issues (except 
for recent initiatives involving 360-degree feedback and life-work balance), 
this study and others suggest that the time is right to consider 
implementing changes that address non-monetary issues. Put very simply, 
since there are things the Navy can’t change, we should work on some 
things that we can. 
Recommendations 
The following recommendations identify initiatives that can influence the retention 
decisions of both men and women. 
1. Analyze 360-degree feedback data available at The Center for Naval 
Leadership to identify specific areas of leadership that require emphasis in 
training and education. 
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2. Should initial analyses of the 360-degree feedback data support it, expand 
the use of such feedback to communities in the Navy not currently using it.  
The automated 360 program as part of the SMARTS system is 
inexpensive and may have the potential to improve leadership more than 
training interventions.  For example, it is known that when leaders derail, it 
is often due to some fatal flaw known by others but not to them because 
they did not get the proper feedback. While subordinates rarely give such 
feedback to seniors, 360-degree feedback provides a vehicle for 
autonomous input. 
3. Review needs for leadership training at various points in the continuum for 
SWO officers.  This effort has already been started by the present authors, 
and tentative findings suggest that Department Head training is the most 
important point for changes because Department Heads have the most 
impact on Division Officers. Such training should explicitly address the 
relationship between leadership and retention—both the positive and the 
negative practices and associated outcomes.  For example, senior officers 
must become more aware of the enormous impact they can have on 
retention when they make their people work unnecessarily long hours 
while they are in port or on shore tours. 
4. Strengthen knowledge of mentoring as an important retention and 
developmental factor at all points in the leadership continuum.  Senior 
officers cannot be “too busy to mentor.” 
5. Strengthen knowledge of important leadership factors when men are 
leading women. This should be done at key points in the training 
continuum. (This was a recommendation in the first report in this series.) 
6. Analyze costs and benefits of detailing more women to fewer ships.  
Focus on assigning women as Department Heads to ships that have 
women on board. (This, too, was a recommendation from the first report in 
this series.) 
7. Continue and accelerate (where possible) all life-work balance initiatives 
such as geographic stability, telecommuting, and off- and on-ramps. This 
research shows that these items are important to both men and women. 
8. Revise this survey and administer it to other Navy IRR communities.  
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Introduction and Background 
This study is the third in a series sponsored by the Chief of Naval Personnel 
(N1) to address the issue of retaining women in the Navy’s Surface Warfare Officer 
(SWO) Community. The results, however, provide recommendations to improve 
retention of both men and women SWOs. 
While waiting on funding from N1, NPS researchers solicited help from a 
thesis student to do preliminary work in the area.  Graham (2006) conducted 
interviews and focus groups with men and women SWOs who had not reached their 
minimum service obligation.  Many of these officers intended to leave the Navy, or at 
least Surface Warfare; many were unsure, but most had very negative opinions of 
the SWO community and lifestyle. These were opinions that had also been heard in 
earlier studies.  
When the funding arrived for NPS researchers to take a look at these issues, 
the decision was made to switch the focus to “successful” women SWOs (women 
who had committed to stay through two Department Head tours or were senior) to 
determine what these women might have in common (Crawford, Thomas, Mehay & 
Bowman, 2006). The motivation of these women was the same as for men: they love 
driving ships; they are tough and thick skinned; they enjoy the camaraderie and 
challenges of succeeding in a difficult environment; and they have had mentors—
both male and female—who have helped them to succeed (and some who have 
convinced them to stay in Surface Warfare). Quantitative data that examined the 
patterns of SWO retention, interviews with SWO men, and patterns of retaining 
women in the private sector were also reported in this study. 
The present study reports on a survey of SWO men and women who have left 
active duty. 
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Problem and Objective 
Low junior officer retention has been the topic of numerous research efforts.  
Studies have shown that SWOs who lateral transfer to other communities stay in the 
Navy longer than those who stay with the Surface Navy (Stoloff, 2007). The Navy 
needs a healthy retention rate in the SWO community to ensure an adequate 
number of officers continue on active duty to meet required manning levels at the 
Department Head level and beyond.   
Stoloff (2007) shows that for FY80-97 cohorts, retention is 32 percent for 
men, and 20 percent for women. He further notes that the gap widened when the 
Combat Exclusion Act was repealed in 1994.  In fact, male retention has increased 
since that point in time, but the retention of women has declined. The steady 
decrease of retention for women SWOs was also shown by Crawford et al. (2006). 
Regardless of the gender of those leaving the Surface Navy, all avenues of policy 
change that could improve retention should be explored. 
The objective of this study is to examine the separation decisions made by a 
select, sizable sample of SWOs now in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) who 
have already separated from active duty service.  This study analyzes the separation 
data, and then considers the meaningful policy implications that could help the Navy 
improve SWO retention. 
The Navy’s previous studies on retention of Surface Warfare Officers have 
gathered “intention” data from SWOs by means of surveys, focus groups, and 
interviews.  That is, the respondents offered input regarding their future plans to 
separate or stay on active duty.  This IRR Survey study is the first formal research 
study to examine the separation decision already made by SWOs who have 
separated from active duty. 
Table 1 displays SWO retention rates for officers who accepted the Surface 
Warfare Officer Continuation Pay (SWOCP) in year groups 1995 through 1999. That 
is, for each year group (YG), the table presents the percentage of officers who chose 
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to take the SWOCP and, hence, continued on to Department Head School and 
subsequent Department Head tours.  
Table 1. SWO Retention Rate Tracking of “SWOCP-takers”  
(as of October 2007) 
(Navy Personnel Command (PERS-41)) 
 YG99 YG95 YG96 YG97 YG98 
Rate 31% 35% 35% 35% 30% 
 
Respondents to the IRR survey primarily span year groups 1983 to 2001.  
Retention rates prior to 1995 are not very pertinent for this study, as the Combat 
Exclusion Law repealed in 1994 significantly changed the career decision-making 
process for women officers. While Table 1 does not track retention for all 
respondents’ year groups, the tracking data for year groups 1995-1999 is fairly 
representative of the trend experienced by the SWO community at the time of 
administration of the survey. 
Retention Analyses from Previous Studies 
Stoker and Mehay (2005) examined previous qualitative and quantitative 
studies impacting retention of SWO women.  Their study found that retention of 
SWO women is primarily impacted by two general factors: a work-personal life 
imbalance (mostly family-related factors) and a dissatisfaction with the SWO culture. 
Stoker and Mehay (2005) found that “Work/Personal Time Balance” and 
“Overall Time Spent Away from Home” are strong reasons that SWOs choose to 
separate from active duty. The impact that a SWO career has on the work/family 
balance strongly influences the retention decision for SWOs, particularly women 
SWOs. Crawford et al. (2006) also documented the concerns these women have 
over potential conflicts between staying successful as a SWO and also finding 
fulfillment as wives and mothers. Thus, unlike more senior women SWOs, this 
younger generation is not fully satisfied by their career alone; they “want to have it 
all.” 
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There has been considerable discussion over the rigidity of the SWO career 
path and how this particularly impacts women who want to take time out to start a 
family.  At one point, it looked as though the new career path, which leaves a 
window of time on shore between second Department Head tour and the Executive 
Officer/Commanding Officer tours would be seen by women as an appropriate time 
to start their families.  Instead, the women interviewed by Crawford et al. (2006) 
expressed concern that they would get selected for Individual Augmentation during 
that time and that most shore tours, such as those in the Pentagon, require very long 
hours anyway. 
Parcell (2007) discussed this “push” factor for women SWOs.  She 
commented that there may be little an employer can do to change work-life 
imbalance, but if it is related to policies, “the Navy needs to minimize inhospitable 
workplace practices and consider personnel management policies that can provide 
for a better work/life balance” (Parcell, 2007, p. 19). 
Retention is also affected by the unique community of Surface Warfare 
Officers, which is characterized as having a “traditional, relatively authoritarian 
leadership style, sea-duty-intensive careers, strenuous at-sea work schedules and a 
very competitive environment for JO’s” (Stoker & Mehay, 2005). Some women report 
dissatisfaction with the culture due to feeling marginalized by the male-dominated 
organization. Crawford et al. (2006) note that this can be a problem particularly when 
there are very small numbers of women on board ships and when women role 
models are lacking—particularly women who are married with children.  SWO 
women don’t see role models of how they want to live their lives; they conclude that 
the choice between career and family is mutually exclusive, and they leave. 
Studies also show a low level of morale in the SWO community, which is 
found to be a contributing factor to low retention, particularly for women. The Navy’s 
Quick Poll Survey Report in 2004, for example, showed that 79 percent of women 
and 61 percent of men ranked SWO morale in the top five reasons for wanting to 
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leave the Navy (Newell, Whittame & Uriell, 2004). In fact, for women, SWO morale 
was the third highest factor in the list. 
This morale factor is, of course, related to culture and also to another key 
dissatisfier for SWOs—that of leadership.  Stoker and Mehay (2005) found that 
SWO junior officers express a general disillusionment with and lack of faith in their 
leadership, which spans from the immediate supervisor level (Department Head) 
through Executive Officer, Commanding Officer, and higher.  In general, the low 
estimation of leadership is defined by micromanagement, a “zero defect” mentality, 
and a general lack of faith that honest, hard work is rewarded.  In fact, leadership is 
a leading factor for leaving the military—the second leading factor according to 
results from the Defense Manpower Data Center exit survey (Hoover, Randolf, Elig, 
& Klein, 2001). 
Crawford et al. (2006) confirmed that, even with the women who had chosen 
to stay, there is concern about negative leadership.  For example, many reported 
that they work unnecessarily long hours only because there is a norm that no one 
leaves until a senior officer leaves, regardless of whether or not work is done. Such 
poor leadership practices, in turn, impact work-life balance and family time. (This 
may be an example of “inhospitable workplace policies” mentioned above.) This 
study also showed that good leadership practices, such as strong mentoring, 
positively affect retention for both men and women. 
The Navy has implemented one promising leadership initiative: a 360-degree 
feedback system to give leaders feedback from direct reports, peers, and seniors on 
what they may not know about their leadership. This feedback is managed by a 
Navy contractor (PDI) and given by a coach to leadership at the flag officer level, 
some 0-6-level officers (those attending the Navy Corporate Business Course), 
Prospective Commanding Officer/Prospective Executive Officer School, Department 
Head School, and Division Officer School. A separate system managed by Center 
for Naval Leadership is pilot testing an automated 360 system aboard Navy ships, 
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which is actually part of a bigger measurement system called SMARTS (Pfautz, 
2007).  Both systems have the potential of improving leadership. 
While the Navy is also beginning to explore some “life-work balance” 
initiatives such as telecommuting and sabbaticals, primary retention efforts to-date 
have focused on monetary incentives—primarily the Surface Warfare Officer 
Continuation Pay (SWOCP) and the Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB).  The 
SWOCP reflects the Navy’s effort to increase the number of SWOs who choose to 
stay in the community on active duty through two afloat Department Head tours. The 
SWOCP contracts are offered to officers who are selected for assignment as a 
Department Head on a surface vessel and will complete Surface Warfare 
Department Head School. The SWOCP was $50,000 at the time it was offered to the 
group surveyed here. In return for the pay, the officers are obligated to complete 
Department Head School and the subsequent two afloat Department Head tours (or 
the single longer tour that has been determined by PERS-41 to be a two-tour 
equivalent). The SWOCP program was introduced in 1999.  The first officers who 
were able to take advantage of the SWOCP were those officers in year group 1994. 
The impact of the bonus on retention is ambiguous. Crawford et al. (2006) 
found that the rise in retention after the introduction of the SWOCP may be 
confounded by patriotism in response to the Global War on Terror, and, in the group 
studied, SWOCP did not impact the retention decision. Parcell (2007) notes that: 
The SWOCP likely has had a positive effect on community retention, although 
perhaps it is smaller than originally anticipated.  However, it does not appear 
to have helped close the gap between male and female SWO retention.  This 
suggests that retention policies other than direct compensation may need to 
be developed. (Parcell, 2007, p. 18) 
Stoloff (2007) examined retention as a function of years of service, marital 
and family status, accession source, competitiveness of college attended and 
college major.  He comments that selection policy interventions based on his 
findings could impact retention but are not a reasonable solution to the problem. He 
queries, “If selection and classification policies do not provide a solution, where else 
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should the Navy turn?” (Stoloff, 2007, p. 2).  He goes on to comment on the 
ambiguity of the effects of the SWOCP. 
An important point was made by Newell et al. (2004) in their recommendation 
to increase the SWOCP based on the 2004 Quick Poll results.  The authors noted 
that their recommendation was based on the intentions expressed in the survey and 
that, “The link between stated intentions and what people would actually do is strong 
but imperfect” (Newell, et al., 2004, p. 64). The present study provides the 
opportunity to examine the impact of the family, leadership, and monetary factors on 
retention from the perspective of SWOs who have actually left active duty. 
Specifically, we hope to add our results to those of others’ to identify actionable 
recommendations. 
The Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)  
Military Service Obligation (MSO): 
Every officer who joined Navy active duty after June 1, 1984, has a military 
service obligation (MSO) of eight years. The vast majority of officers commissioned 
through OCS or NROTC must serve the first four years on active duty.  A very 
limited number of officers with ROTC commissions have a three-year active duty 
obligation.  Members commissioned from the US Naval Academy (USNA) must 
serve five years on active duty. A member who serves on active duty for less than 
his MSO must fulfill his contract by either affiliating with the Navy Reserve and 
becoming a drilling Reservist or by joining the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).  
These two organizations are briefly discussed below.  
After completing their MSO, members may voluntarily stay in the IRR or may 
leave the IRR by resigning their commission.  
Overview of the Ready Reserve: 
The US Navy has both an active duty and Ready Reserve force.  As of 
November 6, 2007, there were 336,596 Navy personnel on active duty, and as of 
September 2007, there were 128, 421 in the Ready Reserve. The Navy Ready 
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Reserve has two categories: Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), with 58,488 persons, 
and Selected Reserve, with 69,933 persons.  The Selected Reserve consists of Full-
time Support (FTS) persons (whose active duty careers focus on administration and 
training of the Navy Reserve) and drilling Selected Reservists (SELRES) (who 
complete 48 drills plus two weeks of annual training per year).  The drilling Selected 
Reservists are the first to be activated.  
Requirements for Participation in the IRR: 
The Secretary of the Navy may order any Ready Reserve member (including 
those in the IRR), without their consent, to active duty for not more than 24 
consecutive months, per USC Sec 12302. Members of the IRR cannot drill for pay or 
retirement points, nor are they eligible for annual training.  However, they may 
perform additional duty for pay, such as Additional Duty Training (ADT), Active Duty 
for Special Work (ADSW), or voluntary mobilization. They also may earn retirement 
points through completing correspondence courses.   
As long as a member completes a "satisfactory year,” meeting the minimum 
requirements of IRR participation, he may stay in the IRR. The requirements include 
providing current information to the Navy on member address, marital status, 
dependency status, military qualifications, civilian occupational skills, and availability 
for service.  Each IRR member is also required to annually submit a certificate of 
physical condition. Members who wish to have their time in the IRR count as 
“qualifying years” towards retirement must earn additional points beyond the 
minimum requirements.  One key benefit of staying in the IRR versus completely 
leaving the military is that IRR members may receive retirement pay and benefits at 
age sixty if they have performed twenty qualifying years of service. 
Failure to fully comply with the IRR Annual Reporting Program can result in 
the member being involuntarily recalled to 45 days of additional active duty.  
Typically, each IRR member receives an Annual Screening Letter with instructions 
on how to complete these annual requirements by mail or on-line.   
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In recent years, during the Global War on Terrorism, the Navy has increased 
its interest in ensuring IRR members fully comply with their annual reporting 
requirements.  Per VADM J.C. Harvey, N1, CNO, in a January 2007 message:    
Annual musters not only afford us the opportunity to collect required 
information but also allow our FTS and SELRES at the Naval Operational 
Support Centers (NOSCs) to remind IRR members that there are a lot of 
opportunities available to them through either more active IRR participation, 
affiliation with the SELRES, or volunteering to mobilize in support of the 
GWOT in an IA status.  
Timeline of the SWO Career Path 
It is important to review the time of each of the various milestones of a SWO’s 
career in order to understand some of the survey responses and also to understand 
at what key career milestones the respondents chose to leave active duty. 
The career path for a SWO involves a series of milestones: 
SWOSDOC:   Traditionally, officers attended a six-month SWO Division 
Officer School (SWOSDOC) held in Newport, Rhode Island, before beginning their 
first sea tour.  Year group 2002 was the last year group to attend SWOSDOC.  
Officers in Year group 2003 were the first group to go directly to their first sea tour 
after commissioning.  SWOSDOC was replaced by computer-based training and on-
the-job training on board ship, followed by three weeks at SWOS in Newport at 
approximately the 18-month point. 
First Division Officer (DIVO) Tour: This is typically a two-year sea tour. 
Second DIVO Tour: This is typically an 18-month sea tour. 
Shore Tour: Typically an officer is given two-year orders for this shore tour.  
If he selects to accept Surface Warfare Officer Continuation Pay and attend 
Department Head School, he may be able to spend up to three years on this shore 
tour. 
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Department Head (DH) Training: This consists of a two-month training in 
Dahlgren, Virginia, followed by a six-month DH School in Newport, Rhode Island.  
Officers must start DH School no later than seven and one-half years after their date 
of commissioning. 
First DH Tour: This typically is an 18-month tour. 
Second DH Tour: This is typically an 18-month tour.  There are some 
opportunities for SWOs to combine both DH tours on the same ship and reduce the 
length of their combined first and second DH tours. 
By the end of the second DH tour, after including some pipeline training, it 
has typically been approximately 10-12 years since a SWO’s commissioning.  After 
the second DH tour, there is more variation in the SWO career path.  Also, by the 
conclusion of the second DH tour, a member’s Lieutenant Commander selection 
board has already met and, if selected, he has likely already been promoted to 0-4. 
Post-DH Shore/Sea Tour and War College/First Joint Tour: The order of 
these two tours is interchangeable.  After these two tours, a member is roughly at 15 
½ years of service. Members are selected for Commander after about 15 years of 
service, which would be during the second of these two tours. Also, by the 
conclusion of these tours, a member has been screened for command, enabling him 
to assume subsequent Executive Officer (XO) and Command Officer (CO) tours. 
XO/CO Fleet Up: Combined, these tours last about three years. 
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Timeline of SWO Promotions 
Table 2.  Flow Points for Surface Warfare Officers 
Rank Flow Point Promotion 
Opportunity 
Ensign (0-1)   -  - 
Lieutenant J.G.(0-2) 2 years AFQ (footnote) 
Lieutenant (0-3) 4 years AFQ 
Lieutenant 
Commander (0-4) 
9-11 years 80 +/- 10% 
Commander (0-5)  15-17 years 70 +/- 10% 
Captain (0-6) 21-23 years 50 +/- 10% 
Source: BUPERS (PERS-412) 
Footnote: AFQ denotes All Fully Qualified 
Table 2 reflects “flow points” during a SWO’s career.  The flow points are the 
typical years of service each member has at the time of promotion to each rank.  As 
the table reflects, the promotion opportunity shrinks for each higher rank above 
Lieutenant. 
Key Milestones Concerning the Decision to Separate: 
In review, there are several key career milestones that are factors in a SWO’s 
decision to separate from active duty: 
The MSO Factor: Officers must remain on active duty for four years (five if 
commissioned through the USNA).  At the four-year point, they typically will have 
just been promoted to the rank of 0-3. 
The SWOCP Factor: Officers must attend DH School no later than at the 
point of reaching seven and one-half years of commissioned service.  So, the 
decision to take the SWOCP—which will commit a person to attending DH school 
and to completing the two subsequent DH tours—is made prior to attending DH tour. 
(Technically, officers must apply for the SWOCP prior to graduation from 
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Department Head School; however, most officers make the application decision prior 
to starting the school.) 
Based on two factors above, we see that the first “window of opportunity” for 
most SWOs to separate from active duty is roughly between four and seven years of 
active commissioned service. This is when most SWOs are recent 0-3s and have 
completed their DIVO tours, but have not yet attended DH School.  
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Methodology 
The FY2006 IRR Muster: 
During the summer of 2006, Navy Personnel Command (NPC) (Pers-93), 
formerly Naval Reserve Personnel Command, conducted a mandatory muster of 
select IRR members, both officers and enlisted.  The purpose of the muster was to 
“assess the overall readiness of the IRR, update our records and provide IRR 
members with information on current mobilization and Selected Reserve 
opportunities.” The “on-site” muster required that the designated IRR members 
report to their local Navy Operational Support Center (NOSC) on a specified date.  
The members were notified that the muster would last approximately two to four 
hours and that they would be required to complete several forms to update and 
verify NPC’s records.  They were also notified that every participating member would 
be paid, by direct deposit, a Muster Duty Allowance of $161.94.  
Members selected for this muster were in specific communities deemed by 
the Bureau of Navy Personnel (BUPERS) to be “High Demand/Low Density,” such 
as the special warfare community. In the previous IRR muster held in 2005, the 
SWO Community was not considered High Demand/Low Density.  For the 2006 IRR 
Muster, however, BUPERS chose to consider the SWO Community High 
Demand/Low Density and include SWO personnel in the muster. 
Navy Personnel Command electronically sent various forms and 
documentation to the NOSCs, along with instructions that the mustering IRR 
personnel were to receive hard-copies of the appropriate forms, complete and 
submit them at the conclusion of the on-site muster period. Of the approximately 
58,000-59,000 total members of the IRR in 2006, NPC selected approximately 4,000 
members for participation in the muster.  
In the spring of 2006, NPC mailed letters to 1,154 SWOs (11XX designators), 
requiring them to attend the summer 2006 muster. After the IRR muster was 
conducted, NPC reported that 567 of the 1,154 responded and received orders. The 
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command assumed that the SWOs who did not respond might not have received the 
orders, due to inaccurate addresses, or they might have disregarded the mailed 
instructions.  Of these 567 SWOs who responded and were sent orders, the 
command reported that 522 actually attended the muster.  
The SWO IRR Survey 
The Naval Postgraduate School, thanks to the support and cooperation from 
Navy Personnel Command (Pers-9), was able to include in the muster package a 
SWO IRR retention survey (see Appendix A) for all mustering SWOs to complete 
and return. After the conclusion of the IRR Muster at each NOSC, the NOSCs 
mailed the completed retention surveys to NPC, which consolidated the forms and 
forwarded them to the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS).   
The surveys were received in the mail by NPS in fall 2006.  The three-page 
survey was titled “Individual Ready Reserve Surface Warfare Officer Survey” and 
had numerous pointedly SWO-specific questions.  The NOSCs were instructed to 
only distribute the survey to SWOs.  NPC reported that 522 SWOs actually attended 
the IRR muster. However, after researchers removed surveys that were identified 
through written comments as being completed by non-SWOs, NPS still received 551 
completed surveys.  It is possible that some non-SWOs were inadvertently 
administered the survey, or it may be that NPC reported the incorrect number of 
completed surveys, but it is not possible to discern this from the survey data.  
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Survey Results and Analysis  
Year and Gender Groups in the Data Analysis 
Surface Warfare Officer Continuation Pay (SWOCP) introduced a new factor 
impacting a SWO’s decision to separate or stay on active duty.  As discussed 
earlier, starting with YG94, Department Head-screened SWOs were offered sizable 
additional pay if they signed a contract to complete Department Head (DH) School 
and the two subsequent DH tours. In addition to basically forcing the separation 
decision to occur before the start of Department Head School, the SWOCP also 
implied that participating officers would need to wait until completing their 
Department Head tours before again having the opportunity to separate. The officers 
in year groups prior to YG94 did not have the option of signing this type of contract, 
which might have meant their decision-making process was significantly different 
than those in later year groups.  In recognition of the fact that SWOs in YG94 and 
later had a different retention decision-making environment than those in YG93 did 
and earlier, the survey analysis in this report separates the respondents into two 
different year group categories—those in YG93 and Earlier and Those in YG94 and 
Later. Responses are also classified by gender for each question, as there is 
particular interest in determining the whether the factors influencing the separation 
decision are different for men than for women. 
Table 3. Total Number of Respondents by Year Group and Gender 
Year Group Men Women Total 
94 and Later 276 (70%) 119 (30%) 395 (100%) 
93 and Earlier 146 (93%) 10 (7%) 156 (100%) 
 
There were 46 respondents who did not respond to Question 7, which asked 
for one’s year group, but who did respond to Question 8, which asked for one’s birth 
year. For purposes of survey data analysis, the assumption is made that a 
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respondent, on average, is commissioned at about age twenty-one—a fairly 
common age to be upon graduation from college.  If a twenty-one-year-old person 
received his commission in 1994, he would have a birth year of 1973.  Those 
respondents born in 1973 and later who did not provide a year group, were 
categorized into the “YG94 or Later” group and those born prior to 1973 were 
categorized into the “YG93 or Earlier” group.   
To facilitate meaningful comparisons across gender and year group 
categories, the responses to each survey question are presented in terms of 
percentages.  The category of women respondents in YG93 or Earlier is the only 
category that has too few respondents to use percentages alone.   For this category, 
the actual number of women is presented in parentheses next to the percentage 
figure. We begin the presentation of the data with the demographics of the survey 
respondents. 
The other demographics of the respondents are summarized in Table 4 and 
shown in full in Appendix B.
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Table 4. Summary of Respondent Demographics 






Are Married 59% 67% 82% 
Have Children 30% 28% 69% 
Age Range 25-37 25-37 41-53 
Rank 90% = 0-3/0-4 80% = 0-3/0-4 93% = 0-4/05 
Active Duty 
Spouse 
3% 34% 2% 
Unemployed 
Spouse 
13% 5% 34% 
USNA 29% 37% 34% 
NROTC 47% 51% 38% 
OCS 17% 7% 23% 
Career Stage at 
Separation 
79% by End of 
DIVO Tours 
83% by End of 
DIVO Tours 
59% by End of 
DIVO Tours 
Had Job Offer 
when Left AC 
47% 38% 52% 
Chose IRR to 
Avoid Risk of 
Recall 
34% 43% 10% 
 
Responses to Survey Questions 
IRR versus Selected Reserve Affiliation Decision 
Respondents were asked the following question: “Why did you separate and 
join the IRR rather than becoming a drilling Navy Reservist?”  Four response options 
were provided:  “Risk of Recall/Mobilization,”  “Did not want to anything to do with 
the Navy,” “I did not know enough about Navy Reserve opportunities,” and “Other.”  
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Some respondents commented under “Other” as their only response and some 
respondents commented under “Other” in addition to selecting one of the three 
closed-ended options.  
Table 5.  IRR versus SELRES Decision for YG94 and Later by Gender 
(Percentage) 
 














Men 34 14 4 48 0 
Women 43 10 2 44 1 
 
 Of the three response options (not including additional comments) 
provided in the survey, most respondents chose not to affiliate with the 
Navy Reserve as a drilling Selected Reservist (SELRES) because they 
did not want to risk being recalled back to active duty.  This reason is 
slightly stronger for women than for men. 
 While only a small percentage of respondents selected the option, “I 
did not know enough about Navy Reserve opportunities,” the actual 
percentage of respondents who did not have adequate information 
about the Reserve to make an affiliation decision may be higher.  
Several respondents’ written comments state they did not affiliate with 
the Navy Reserve because they received an “exit bonus” or severance 
pay package from the Navy and, hence, were ineligible to drill for pay.   
In reality, members who receive separation pay are eligible to receive 
drill pay as a Navy Reservist, but later, if they become eligible for a 
Reserve retirement pay, will have to pay back the separation pay.  
Several other respondents’ comments state they had “twice failed to 
select” to the next higher paygrade and, hence, were unable to 
continue service in the Navy Reserve.  However, in reality, members 
can twice fail to select while on active duty and then affiliate with the 
Reserve.  Once Reservists, they are allowed two more failures.  Even 
then, Lieutenant Commanders are still allowed to drill until they reach 
20 years of commissioned service, after which they would be 
discharged.  Hence, both of these types of comments reveal possible 
misunderstanding of the eligibility rules for affiliation with the Navy 
Reserve.  
 - 19 - 
Written Comments for YG994 and Later:  
 Among respondents’ written comments, the perceived time 
commitment associated with being SELRES is the primary reason for 
the decision to go into the IRR rather than to affiliate with the Navy 
Reserve. 
 Women, more frequently than men, comment that they feel it would be 
too difficult to meet the time commitment required by the Navy Reserve 
while also tending to a family and additionally, in some cases, while the 
spouse is on active duty. 
Table 6.  Why IRR versus SELRES for YG93 and Earlier by Gender 
(Men-Percentage; Women-Percentage/Frequency) 
 
Risk of recall/ 
mobilization 
Did not want 
to continue 
with Navy 








Men 10 1 8 79 1 
Women 22(4) 6(1) 6(1) 66(8) 0 
 
 A smaller percentage of respondents in YG93 and Earlier than of those 
in the more recent year groups indicates that they did not affiliate with 
the Navy Reserve due to concern of being mobilized. 
Senior Officer Presence in the IRR 
It is important to review several aspects of the Navy Reserve billet system to 
best understand why a seemingly large number of senior officers are in the IRR. 
Junior officers—LCDR and below—typically are able to maintain a pay status 
in the Navy Reserve.  While a few pay billets for junior officers require selection by a 
board, the vast majority of junior officer billets can be filled without selection by a 
board.  However, senior Reserve officers must be selected by a board for pay billets.  
Every year, a national selection board is held to select 0-5 and above officers to fill 
applicable Reserve billets. Billet assignment duration is typically two years; each 
year, tenure in roughly half the Reserve senior billets expires, resulting in a sizable 
annual inflow and outflow of senior officers in pay billets.  The number of senior 
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officers applying for billets outnumbers the number of available pay billets.  Officers 
who are not selected for a pay billet may retire, if eligible, or may transfer to the IRR.   
While in the IRR, officers may continue to apply for billets in subsequent 
boards in hopes of rejoining the Navy Reserve in a pay status.  In this way, the IRR 
acts as a sort of revolving door for senior officers in the Navy Reserve.  Some senior 
officers enter the IRR directly from active duty and choose merely to remain in the 
IRR to reach retirement eligibility, with no intention of being a drilling Navy Reservist.  
However, a great many senior officers in the IRR are previously drilling Reservists 
and are in a virtual “holding pattern” in the IRR while they seek to regain a pay billet 
in a future selection board. 
The respondents in YG94 and Later, as compared to those in YG93 and 
Earlier, are much more likely to be junior officers than senior officers.  Hence, it is 
reasonable to expect more respondents in YG93 and Earlier, than in the later group, 
to be prior drilling Reservists.  
Written Comments for YG93 and Earlier 
 For respondents in YG93 and Earlier, the majority of written comments 
regarding why they are in the IRR rather than a drilling Reservist 
indicate that they already were previously in the Navy Reserve and 
were “promoted out of a pay billet.”  This type of comment implies that 
they were transferred from the Navy Reserve into the IRR due to being 
in a paygrade that requires board selection for a billet and that they 
were not selected for a pay billet.  As this YG93 and Earlier group has 
relatively more senior officers than the other group, it is not surprising 
that more of its respondents have already been in the Navy Reserve, 
as mentioned above. 
 Similar to the comment from respondents in YG94 and Later, 
comments from respondents in the earlier year groups also reveal that 
difficulty in meeting the Navy Reserve’s time commitment is a reason 
for staying the IRR. 
Factors That Influenced the Decision to Leave Active Duty 
The survey asked respondents the following question: “To what degree did 
the following factors influence your decision to leave active duty?” Respondents 
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were provided with a list of 28 factors that might have influenced their separation 
decision.  They were asked to rate the degree of influence of each factor using the 
following four options: “Very Strong Influence,” “Strong Influence,” “Minor Influence,” 
and “No Influence.”  
The following sections provide two tables—one for YG94 and Later and one 
for YG93 and Earlier—with the order of magnitude of each factor’s influence on the 
separation decision for respondents.  The percentage listed next to each factor 
represents the percentage of respondents who felt each factor was either a “Very 
Strong” or a “Strong” Influence.   
Following each of the two year group summary tables, a more detailed 
examination of each factor’s degree of influence on the respondents’ separation 
decision is provided. 
Comparison of 28 Separation Factors—YG94 and Later 
Table 7. Degree of Influence of Factors on Separation Decision for YG94 and 
Later by Gender 
  "Very Strong" or" Strong" Influence—Year Group 94 and Later 
(Percentage)




Factors in Order of Influence 
1.  Strain on family life/family separation 70 75 1.  Strain on family life/family separation 
1.  Overall time spent away from home. 70 74 2. Ability to start/grow a family. 
2.  Imbalance between work and personal time. 64 72 3.  Imbalance between work and personal time. 
3. Ability to start/grow a family. 63 66 4.  Overall time spent away from home. 
4. Uncertainty of work schedule. 48 54 5. Uncertainty of work schedule. 
5. Quality of leadership in SWO community. 47 50 6. Balancing my Navy career with a spouse's career. 
6. Morale in the SWO community. 40 44 7. Quality of leadership in SWO community. 
7.  Work load/hours in port. 36 41 8.  Work load/hours in port. 
8. Insufficient geographic stability in tours. 35 41 8. Morale in the SWO community. 
8. Work load/hours while at sea. 35 40 9. Work load/hours while at sea. 
9. Separation from my children while deployed. 31 32 10. Ability to develop personal relationships 
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10. Ability to develop personal relationships. 30 32 10. Insufficient geographic stability in tours. 
11. "Zero defects" SWO environment/honest 
mistakes punished. 28 30 11. Separation from my children while deployed. 
12. Balancing my Navy career with a spouse's 
career. 25 28 12. Lack of SWO role model. 
13. Lack of SWO role model. 20 26 13. Lack of SWO mentor. 
14. Amount of total military pay and compensation. 19 21 14. "Zero defects" SWO environment/honest mistakes punished. 
14. Lack of SWO mentor. 19 17 15. Existence of sexual discrimination. 
15. Lack of opportunity for funded graduate 
education. 16 15 
16. Lack of opportunity for full-time graduate 
education. 
16. Opportunities for promotion. 15 12 17. Lack of opportunity for funded graduate education. 
17. Unable to lateral transfer to another community. 14 10 18. Lack of opportunity for one-year sabbatical. 
18. Recognition (FITREPs/Awards, etc.). 13 9 19. Amount of total military pay and compensation.
19. Lack of opportunity for full-time graduate 
education. 12 8 20. Recognition (FITREPs/Awards, etc.). 
20. Amount of SWO Continuation Pay. 7 8 20. Unable to lateral transfer to another community. 
21. Amount of Critical Skills Bonus. 6 6 21. Opportunities for promotion. 
21. Lack of opportunity for one-year sabbatical. 6 6 21. Amount of SWO Continuation Pay. 
22. Navy medical benefits. 5 6 21. Navy medical benefits. 
23. Navy retirement benefits. 2 4 22. Amount of Critical Skills Bonus. 
23. Existence of sexual discrimination. 2 3 23. Navy retirement benefits. 
Note: The number of respondents varied slightly for each of the 28 response options; each question had approximately 
260-262 male respondents and 104-107 women respondents.   
 
 These factors fall into one of three categories: 1) family/personal time; 
2) leadership—factors that either senior Navy leadership or immediate 
leaders can control such as morale, culture, sexual discrimination, or 
hours in port; and 3) benefits, some guaranteed (e.g., retirement pay), 
and some not, such as graduate education, or a lateral transfer. 
However, there is overlap among some of these factors.  For example, 
work hours in port is widely reported as a leadership factor—senior 
leaders keeping people longer than necessary or “Navy Leadership” 
putting too many requirements on ships.  On the other hand, are hours 
while deployed hard requirements or the result of leader preferences?  
In this report, work/load hours in port is counted as a leadership factor, 
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while work/load hours at sea is not.  In the analyses that follow, work 
hours at sea rank lower as an influence on separation than work hours 
in port.  This is consistent with earlier research by Crawford et al. 
(2006) in which officers repeatedly said that they didn’t mind being 
deployed—it was doing the work that they enjoyed about the Navy.  It 
was long hours in port that were demoralizing and considered 
unnecessary. This is one of several items that should be improved on 
a follow-on survey to more specifically determine what respondents are 
reacting to. Similarly, is recognition a function of leadership or can it be 
seen as a “benefit”?  This item was included here as a benefit. 
 There are seven family/personal factors, and these ratings (when 
ordered from highest to lowest) place as the top four for both men and 
women. If the list is broken into thirds, other family/personal factors 
appear in the second third of women’s ratings. There are 10 leadership 
items, and these appear in the first and second thirds of the list for both 
men and women.  Last, there are 11 benefit items, and with a few 
exceptions, these items appear in the bottom third of the ordering of 
the ratings.  The exceptions are “Amount of total military pay,” “Funded 
graduate education,” and “Promotion opportunities” for men, and the 
two graduate education items for women. 
 It is worth noting that among the benefit items in the bottom third of this 
list, both men and women rate the bonuses very low as compared 
other factors that caused them to separate. These factors placed in the 
lowest four ratings for women and the bottom six for men. 
 Not surprisingly, a greater percentage of women (17%) than men (2%) 
rate “Existence of sexual discrimination” as a very strong or strong 
influence on separation.  In fact, this factor rating is fifteenth (middle of 
the list) for the women in this year group. 
 Given the literature described earlier, the most surprising aspect of 
these findings is the similarity in the order of the rating of the factors for 
men and women. Two notable differences are the placement of 
“Balancing my Navy career with a spouse’s career,” (rated sixth 
highest by women and twelfth by men), and “Amount of total military 
pay and compensation” (rated fourteenth highest by men and 
nineteenth by women). “Ability to start/grow a family” is rated high by 
both men and women, but the percentage for women is nine points 
higher. “Opportunities for promotion” was rated higher by men than by 
women. 
The table in the previous section presents the percentage of respondents who 
rate each factor as having either a “Very Strong” or “Strong” influence in the 
separation decision.  In some cases, respondents in a gender/year group category 
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were fairly split in terms of considering a factor to have a very strong or strong 
influence.  However, in other cases, when evaluating the influence of a factor, 
respondents sided predominantly with either “Very Strong” or “Strong.” 
It may be helpful to shed further light on how extreme an influence 
respondents consider each factor to be.  In this section, we will examine those 
influential factors that the percentage of respondents considered being 
predominantly either “Very Strong” or “Strong.” For purposes of this report, if the 
percentage of respondents rating a factor’s influence as “Very Strong” is within ten 
percentage points of the percentage rating the influence as “Strong,” it is considered 
a fairly even split.  
Of the 28 factors that were presented in the survey, 21 have a fairly even split 
of respondents rating them as “Very Strong” or “Strong.”  With each of the remaining 
seven separation factors, respondents’ evaluations weigh more heavily on either 
“Very Strong” or “Strong,” as presented below.
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Table 8.  Influence on Separation Factors—YG94 and Later: Differences 
Greater than 10 Percentage Points between "Very Strong" and "Strong" 
   Men Women 
Separation Factor  Very Strong Strong Very Strong Strong 
Imbalance between work and personal time -1 - 46 26 
Strain on family life/family separation 43 27 52 23 
Separation from children while deployed 23 8 24 6 
Ability to start/grow a family 37 26 50 24 
Balancing Navy career with spouse's career - - 34 16 
Overall time spent away from home - - 49 17 
Uncertainty of work schedule - - 34 20 
 
 The three family-specific factors are predominantly “Very Strong” 
separation decision influences for both men and women in YG94 and 
Later, although two of these are stronger for women—which is 
consistent with the literature described earlier.  
 Work-personal time imbalance, spouse-member career imbalance, 
time away from home, and work schedule uncertainty are 






Comparison of 28 Separation Factors—YG93 and Earlier  
 
                                            
1 The “-“ symbol indicates a difference of under 10% for men 
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Table 9. Degree of Influence of Factors on Separation Decision for YG93 and 
Earlier by Gender 
    "Very Strong" or" Strong" Influence  
(Percentage for Men, Percentage/Frequency for Women) 
Factors in Order of Influence %  Men 
% / #  
Women Factors in Order of Influence 
1.  Ability to start/grow a family. 58 50/5 1. Uncertainty of work schedule. 
2.  Strain on family life/family separations. 53 40/4 2. Imbalance between work and personal time. 
3.  Overall time spent away from home. 52 40/4 2. Strain on family life/family separation. 
4.  Imbalance between work and personal 
time. 
48 40/4 2. Ability to start/grow a family. 
5.  Separation from my children while 
deployed. 
44 40/4 2. Work load/hours while in port. 
6.  Work load/hours while in port. 35 40/4 2. Opportunities for promotion. 
7. Morale in the SWO community. 29 40/4 2. Recognition (FITREPs/Awards, etc.). 
8.  Uncertainty of work schedule. 28 30/3 3. Ability to develop personal relationships. 
9.  Work load/hours while at sea. 27 30/3 3. Balancing Navy career with spouse's career. 
9.  Quality of leadership in SWO 
community. 
27 30/3 3. Overall time spent away from home. 
10.  Ability to develop personal 
relationships. 
23 30/3 3. Insufficient geographic stability in tours. 
10.  Amount of total military pay. 23 30/3 3. Morale in the SWO community. 
11. Insufficient geographic stability in tours. 22 30/3 3. Quality of leadership in SWO community. 
11. "Zero defects" SWO 
environment/honest mistakes punished. 
22 30/3 3. Lack of SWO role model. 
12.  Opportunities for promotion. 20 30/3 3.  Lack of SWO mentor. 
13.  Lack of SWO role model. 19 30/3 3. Existence of sexual discrimination. 
14.  Recognition (FITREPs/Awards, etc.). 15 20/2 4. Separation from children while deployed. 
14.  Lack of SWO mentor. 15 20/2 4. Work load/hours while at sea. 
15.  Amount of SWO Continuation Pay. 13 20/2 4. "Zero defects" SWO environment/honest 
mistakes punished. 
16.  Balancing my Navy career with a 
spouse's career. 
12 20/2 4. Amount of Critical Skills Bonus. 
17.  Unable to lateral transfer to another 
community. 
10 20/2 4. Navy medical benefits. 
18.  Navy retirement benefits. 8 20/2 4. Lack of opportunity for one-year sabbatical. 
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19.  Amount of Critical Skills Bonus. 6 20/2 4. Lack of opportunity for funded graduate 
education. 
19.  Lack of opportunity for funded graduate 
education. 
6 20/2 4. Lack of opportunity for full-time graduate 
education. 
19.  Lack of opportunity for full-time 
graduate education. 
6 10/1 5. Unable to lateral transfer to another 
community. 
20.  Lack of opportunity for one-year 
sabbatical. 
5 10/1 5. Amount of SWO Continuation Pay. 
21.  Navy medical benefits. 3 10/1 5. Amount of total military pay and 
compensation. 
22.  Existence of sexual discrimination. 0 10/1 5. Navy retirement benefits. 
Note: The number of respondents varied slightly for each of the 28 response options; each question had 
approximately 140-143 male respondents and 9-10 women respondents. 
 
 None of the ratings for “Very Strong” or “Strong” are as high for those 
in YG93 and Earlier as in YG94 and Later.  There is no way to explain 
why one group’s ratings are so different from the other’s.  Therefore, it 
is more important to examine the ordering of the ratings—highest to 
lowest—of the factors when the two groups are compared. 
 As with respondents in YG94 and Later, the respondents in YG93 and 
Earlier place highest priority on family and personal time concerns, 
with respect to influences on the separation decision.  In fact, the five 
most influential factors for men all relate to the family/personal-work life 
imbalance. These factors are rated at the top for women as well, 
although the very small sample size of women in YG93 and Earlier 
precludes meaningful analysis. In this section, analysis of the 
responses to Question 12 for those in YG93 and Earlier will be limited 
to men, unless otherwise stated.  
 Interestingly, many of the leadership factors were rated similarly by 
men in YG93 and Earlier as compared to men and women in YG94 
and Later. Attitudes about role models were slightly different for the 
two groups (fewer respondents in YG93 and Earlier rated that factor as 
a “Very Strong” or “Strong” influence as compared to the later group), 
but responses on the influence of the lack of a mentor were similar. 
 Theoretically, respondents in YG93 and Earlier should not have been 
offered the opportunity to accept the SWOCP, since it was first 
introduced to officers in later year groups.  Of the 157 respondents in 
YG93 and Earlier, nineteen men and one woman actually responded 
that the amount of the SWOCP had a very strong or strong influence 
on their decision to separate. In hindsight, this group may have been 
reacting to the fact that they were not offered a bonus.  It is not 
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possible to compare the influence of the SWOCP across our two year-
group categories, since it is primarily not applicable to those in the 
earlier year groups. This is an item that needs to be changed if this 
survey is administered again. 
 Medical and retirement benefits have a low influence on those in YG93 
and Earlier, as with YG94 and Later, although pay was rated slightly 
higher by the earlier year group. 
 In general, the men in YG93 and Earlier followed the same pattern as 
the later group—rankings were highest for family factors, followed by a 
mix of family and leadership factors, with benefits primarily in the 
bottom third of the list.  The exceptions were: “Amount of total military 
pay” (rated tenth), “Opportunities for promotion” (rated twelfth), and 
“Recognition (FITREPS/awards, etc.)” (rated fourteenth).  
 When the “Very Strong” ratings were separated out for this group, only 
one factor—“Strain on family life/family separation”—was rated 
predominately in this category (32%) as compared to the “Strong” 
category (21%). 
Current Feeling about Separation Decision 
In this question, respondents were asked which of four statements (selecting any 
that apply) describe their current feeling about their separation decision.  
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Table 10.  Current Feeling about Separation Decision for FY94 and Later 
(Percentage) 
(Listed in order of percentage of respondents who agree with each statement) 
 Men Women 
“I do not regret leaving 
my active duty SWO 
career at all.” 
82 81 
“I sometimes wish I 
had stayed on active 
duty as a SWO.” 
11 8 
“My civilian 
work/lifestyle is not as 
great an improvement 
over active duty as I’d 
hoped.” 
7 6 
“I would return to active 
duty if my separation 
time were not a 




 Men and women share the same order of agreement regarding the 
four statements.  The majority of both genders do not regret leaving 
their active duty SWO career.
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Table 11.  Current Feeling about Separation Decision for FY93 and Earlier 
(Men: Percentage, Women: Percentage/Frequency) 
(Listed in order of percentage of men who agree with each statement) 
 Men Women 
“I do not regret leaving 
my active duty SWO 
career at all.” 
72 70 (7) 
“I sometimes wish I 
had stayed on active 
duty as a SWO.” 
17 10 (1) 
“I would return to active 
duty if my separation 
time were not a 
liability to my 
promotion prospects.” 
5 20 (2) 
“My civilian 
work/lifestyle is not as 
great an improvement 
over active duty as I’d 
hoped.” 
4 0 (0) 
 
 Similar to respondents in YG94 and Later, the majority of men and 
women in YG93 and Earlier do not regret leaving their active duty 
SWO career at all. 
Improvements That Might Lead to Return to Active Duty 
This question explores what factors might entice a separated SWO to return 
to active duty.  The following statement is posed: “I would now consider returning to 
active duty if there were significant improvements in: (factor).” Seventeen factors 
were presented, with the opportunity for respondents to indicate “Yes,” “No,” or 
“Maybe” for each factor.  Respondents were also given the opportunity to provide a 
written comment, if desired.  The following table presents the percentage of 
respondents who indicated “Yes” in response to whether they would now consider 
returning to active duty if there were significant improvements in the stated factor. 
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Table 12. Potential Influences on Returning to Active Duty: "Yes" 
Responses for YG94 and Later by Gender2 
(Percentage) 
MEN Yes Yes WOMEN 
1. Overall time spent away from home. 17 28 1. Overall time spent away from home. 
2. Work load/hours in port. 15 25 2. Quality of leadership in SWO community. 
2. Certainty of work schedule. 15 21 3. Morale in the SWO community. 
3. Ability to lateral transfer to another 
community. 14 21 3. Certainty of work schedule. 
4. Geographic stability. 13 20 4. Work load/hours in port. 
4. Opportunities for promotion. 13 19 5. Geographic stability. 
4. Morale in the SWO community. 13 17 6. Ability to lateral transfer to another community.
4. Quality of leadership in SWO community. 13 16 7. Opportunities for one-year sabbatical. 
5. Work load/hours at sea. 11 16 7. Opportunities for full-time graduate education. 
6. Amount of total military pay and 
compensation. 9 13 8. Work load/hours at sea. 
6. Opportunities for full-time graduate 
education. 9 13 8. Opportunities for funded graduate education. 
7. Amount of SWO Continuation Pay. 8 11 9. Amount of total military pay and compensation. 
7. Opportunities for funded graduate education. 8 9 10. Amount of SWO Continuation Pay. 
8. Opportunities for one-year sabbatical. 7 9 10. Amount of Critical Skills Bonus. 
9. Navy retirement benefits. 6 8 11. Opportunities for promotion. 
10. Amount of Critical Skills Bonus. 5 7 12. Navy medical benefits. 
10. Navy medical benefits. 5 6 13. Navy retirement benefits. 
 
 Among respondents in YG94 and Later, for each “potential 
improvement factor” presented, proportionately more women than men 
indicate they would consider returning to active duty. 
 After “Overall time spent away from home,” personal time-related and 
leadership factors are most influential for both men and women. 
                                            
2 The number of respondents varied slightly for each of the 17 response options; each question had 
approximately 257-264 male respondents and 110-111 women respondents. 
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 Opportunities for promotion are more important to men than to women. 
 Quality of leadership and morale in the community is high on the list for 
both men and women, although women consider SWO leadership and 
morale to be potential “rejoin drivers” at nearly twice the rate as do 
men. 
 The benefit, “Ability to lateral transfer to another community” is high on 
the list for both men and women. 
 Improvements in monetary factors (i.e., SWOCP, military pay, and a 
bonus), as well as indirect monetary factors (i.e., retirement and 
medical benefits), have relatively little influence in enticing both men 
and women respondents to return to active duty. 
In addition to those respondents who say they would consider returning to 
active duty (as presented above), some respondents indicate that they might 
consider rejoining.  In fact, in the gender-specific tables below, we see that a sizable 
percentage of respondents indicate they either would or might (combined) be 
influenced to rejoin, given improvements in certain factors.  However, there are still 
more negative than positive responses, which is consistent with the feelings about 
the separation decision (Table 24)—showing that the majority do not regret their 
decision to leave active duty. 
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Table 13. Potential Influences on Returning to Active Duty for Men in YG94 and 




Yes & Maybe 
1. The overall time spent away from home. 17 20 37 
2. Geographic stability. 13 16 29 
2. Work load/hours in port. 15 14 29 
2. Ability to lateral transfer to another community. 14 15 29 
3. Certainty of work schedule. 15 13 28 
4. Quality of leadership in the SWO community. 13 13 26 
5. Morale in the SWO community. 13 12 25 
5. Amount of total military pay and compensation. 9 16 25 
6. Work load/hours at sea. 11 13 24 
7. Opportunities for promotion. 13 9 22 
7. Amount of SWO Continuation Pay. 8 14 22 
8. Opportunities for one-year sabbatical. 7 14 21 
9. Opportunities for full-time graduate education. 9 11 20 
10. Amount of Critical Skills Bonus. 5 14 19 
10. Navy retirement benefits. 6 13 19 
11. Opportunities for funded graduate education. 8 10 18 
12. Navy medical benefits. 5 12 17 
 
 The top “Combined” factor is the same as the top “Yes”-only factor—
overall time spent away from home. Over a third of men in YG94 and 
Later feel that improving the overall time away from home would or 
might cause them to consider rejoining active duty. 
 Pay and benefits remain in the lower positions of these ratings. 
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Table 14. Potential Influences on Returning to Active Duty for Women in YG94 
and Later: Combined “Yes” and “Maybe” Responses 
(Percentage) 
Yes Maybe Yes/Maybe 
1. The overall time spent away from home. 28 24 52 
2. Certainty of work schedule. 21 21 42 
3. Geographic stability. 19 21 40 
4. Ability to lateral transfer to another community. 17 22 39 
5. Work load/hours in port. 20 18 38 
5. Quality of leadership in the SWO community. 25 13 38 
6. Morale in the SWO community. 21 14 35 
7. Opportunities for one-year sabbatical. 16 18 34 
8. Opportunities for full-time graduate education. 16 17 33 
9. Opportunities for funded graduate education. 13 19 32 
10. Work load/hours at sea. 13 18 31 
11. Amount of total military pay and compensation. 11 13 24 
12. Navy medical benefits. 7 16 23 
13. Amount of SWO Continuation Pay. 9 13 22 
13. Amount of Critical Skills Bonus. 9 13 22 
14. Opportunities for promotion. 8 13 21 
14. Navy retirement benefits. 6 15 21 
 
 When combining the “Yes” and “Maybe” responses for YG94 and 
Later, women are still more interested than men in returning to active 
service given potential improvements in specific factors.  In fact, over 
half of these women would or might consider rejoining were there an 
improvement in the overall time spent away from home. 
 The pattern of lower ratings for pay and benefits holds for this group. 
 - 35 - 
Table 15. Potential Influences on Returning to Active Duty:  "Yes" Responses 
for YG93 and Earlier by Gender3 
(Percentage/Frequency) 
MEN Yes Yes WOMEN 
1. Work load/hours in port. 18 40/4 1. Opportunities for promotion. 
2. Geographic stability. 16 30/3 2. Geographic stability. 
3. Overall time spent away from home. 15 30/3 2. Morale in the SWO community. 
3. Opportunities for promotion. 15 20/2 3. The overall time spent away from home. 
4. Quality of leadership in SWO community. 14 20/2 3. Work load/hours at sea. 
4. Amount of total military pay and compensation. 14 20/2 3. Work load/hours in port. 
5. Morale in the SWO community. 13 20/2 3. Certainty of work schedule. 
6. Opportunities for funded graduate education. 12 20/2 3. Amount of Critical Skills Bonus. 
7. Certainty of work schedule. 11 20/2 3. Amount of total military pay and compensation. 
7. Navy retirement benefits. 11 20/2 3. Opportunities for one-year sabbatical. 
8. Ability to lateral transfer to another community. 10 20/2 3. Opportunities for funded graduate education. 
8. Work load/hours at sea. 10 20/2 3. Opportunities for full-time graduate education. 
8. Opportunities for full-time graduate education. 10 10/1 4. Ability to lateral transfer to another community. 
8. Amount of SWO Continuation Pay. 10 10/1 4. Quality of leadership in SWO community. 
9. Opportunities for one-year sabbatical. 9 10/1 4. Amount of SWO Continuation Pay. 
9. Navy medical benefits. 9 10/1 4. Navy retirement benefits. 
10. Amount of Critical Skills Bonus. 6 10/1 4. Navy medical benefits. 
 
                                            
3 The number of respondents varied slightly for each of the 17 response options; each question had 
approximately 257-264 male respondents and 110-111 women respondents. 
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 Similar to YG94 and Later, personal time-related, leadership/morale-
related factors, and the opportunity for promotion have the greatest 
influence on respondents’ consideration of returning to active duty, 
while incentive-related factors (benefits, pay, education, etc.) and 
workload at-sea are least influential.  
As was done with the later year group category, we now turn to the gender-
specific tables displaying the combined “Yes” and “Maybe” responses to the 
potential rejoin factors. 
Table16. Potential Influences on Returning to Active Duty for Men in YG93 and 
Earlier: Combined "Yes" and "Maybe" 
(Percentage) 
Yes Maybe Combined 
Yes & Maybe
1. The overall time spent away from home. 15 18 33 
2. Amount of total military pay and compensation. 14 16 30 
3. Geographic stability. 16 12 28 
3. Work load/hours in port. 18 10 28 
4. Opportunities for promotion. 15 10 25 
4. Morale in the SWO community. 13 12 25 
5. Quality of leadership in the SWO community. 14 10 24 
5. Navy retirement benefits. 11 13 24 
6. Certainty of work schedule. 11 12 23 
6. Opportunities for funded graduate education. 12 11 23 
7. Ability to lateral transfer to another community. 10 12 22 
7. Opportunities for full-time graduate education. 10 12 22 
8. Work load/hours at sea. 10 11 21 
8. Opportunities for one-year sabbatical. 9 12 21 
9. Amount of SWO Continuation Pay. 10 9 19 
9. Navy medical benefits. 9 10 19 
10. Amount of Critical Skills Bonus. 6 7 13 
 
 - 37 - 
 About one-third of men in YG93 and Earlier would or might consider 
returning to active duty were there improvements in the overall time 
spent away from home. 
 Incentive-related factors (benefits, pay, education, etc.) and workload 
at-sea are least influential.  
Potential Actions to Improve SWO Retention 
The majority of the survey questions are closed-ended, meaning respondents 
were presented with options to select or to agree or disagree with statements.  While 
closed-ended questions are best suited for quantitative analysis (frequencies, 
averages, etc.), such questions do not permit respondents to select an answer other 
than one provided in the survey.  Open-ended questions, however, provide 
respondents with an opportunity to address an issue not previously addressed in the 
survey or to elaborate further on specific issues.   
Questions 15 and 16 in the SWO IRR Survey are open-ended questions 
designed to provide such opportunities to the respondents.   Many, but not all, of the 
respondents provided written comments to these two questions.  Based on the 
topics addressed in the comments, various issues were identified; the comments 
were thus categorized into appropriate issue groups.  Some respondents offered 
numerous comments that addressed several different categories.  Therefore, the 
total number of respondents does not equal the total number of comments.  It should 
also be noted that many of the issues identified are not discrete issues and may 
overlap into other issues. 
In Question 15 of the survey, respondents were asked, “In your opinion, what 




 - 38 - 
Table 17. Potential Retention Measures Generated from Respondent 
Comments Men in YG94 and Later 
Potential Area of Improvement Percentage
4/Number of 
Comments5 
SWO Leadership and Culture 36% (78) 
Includes:  
Mentoring/counseling 5% (11) 
In-port Work Hours 3% (7) 
Other Comments about Leadership 17% (36) 
SWO Treatment of People/Mentality 3% (7) 
SWO Quality of Life/Morale 8% (17) 
Work Load/OPTEMPO 16% (34) 
Includes:  
Deployment/Sea Shore Rotation 10% (21) 
Work Stability/Certainty of Schedule 3% (7) 
Work Load Level Overall 3% (6) 
Family/Home/Personal Time 7% (14) 
Business Process/Organization 10% (20) 
Includes:  
Organizational focus/processes 6% (12) 
Training/SWOS 4% (8) 
Career Path/Detailing 14% (31) 
Includes:  
Promotions/Accessions/FITREPs 5% (12) 
Career Tracks/Assignments 9% (19) 
Incentive Programs 12% (25) 
Includes:  
Pay (Pay, SWOCP, etc.) 9% (19) 
Graduate Education 3% (6) 
Misc. 6% (13) 
 
                                            
4 Total percentage of 101% due to rounding error. 
5 Men in YG94 and Later provided 215 issue-specific comments to Question #15. 
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Respondents feel that improvements in three general areas—SWO  
leadership, culture and work/life balance—would  improve SWO retention.  Many 
comments reflect a feeling that SWO leadership—at the Department Head level and 
upwards—does not support or nurture its more junior officers, rather that leadership 
is overly focused on exerting authority or its own career promotion.  Examples of 
these leadership-related comments include: “Too much worrying about own career 
at DH level and not being a good role model/mentor for Junior SWO’s”  and 
“Remove the God complex in CO’s.” 
Of course, some of these three areas overlap; for instance, leadership can 
greatly influence culture and morale. One respondent states: “I think morale is a big 
deal—make JO’s, DH’s, CO’s happy and the positive effect ripples throughout the 
command and individual careers.  My first CO was extremely effective at this and 
made me want to stay.  My second CO didn’t trust me […] made us feel really 
helpless, like our hands were tied. This made me want to get out ASAP.” 
Similarly, another respondent’s comment reflects the interaction between 
strong leadership and morale among junior officers and overall workload: “A stronger 
emphasis must be placed upon respecting the junior officer community and the 
amount of work and devotion given to support the Navy (i.e., no hazing of JO’s, 
better training of JO’s in handling of division, etc.”  
Overall, respondents do not indicate in their comments that improving the 
level of pay would improve retention.  One respondent even states: “Decrease the 
SWO Continuation pay bonus.  Monetary incentive programs keep the wrong people 
and are often done to shield deeper issues.”  
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Table 18. Potential Retention Measures Generated from Respondent 
Comments: Women in YG94 and Later 
Potential Area of Improvement Percentage/Number of 
Comments6 
SWO Leadership and Culture 49% (51) 
Includes:  
SWO Treatment of People/Mentality 11% (11) 
SWO Quality of Life/Morale 12% (12) 
Mentoring/counseling 5% (5) 
In-port Work Hours 6% (6) 
Other comments about leadership 15% (17) 
Work Load/OPTEMPO 10% (10) 
Includes:   
Deployment/Sea Shore Rotation 2% (2) 
Work Stability/Certainty of Schedule 8% (8) 
Family/Home/Personal Time 10% (10) 
Business Process/Organization 3% (3) 
Includes:  
Training/SWOS 3% (3) 
Career Path/Detailing 18% (19) 
Includes:   
Promotions/Accessions 5% (6) 
Career Tracks/Assignments 9% (9) 
Sabbatical 4% (4) 
Incentive Programs   5% (5) 
Includes:  
Pay (Pay, SWOCP, etc.) 3% (3) 
Graduate Education  2% (2) 
Misc. 5% (5) 
 
                                            
6 Women in YG94 and Later provided 103 issue-specific comments to Question #15. 
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Like their male counterparts, women in YG94 largely comment that the key 
ways to improve retention lie in improving SWO leadership and culture and work/life 
balance.  Women respondents offer interesting insights into the work/life balance, 
including: “My husband is a submariner and I was a SWO. During our first three 
years of marriage, we only spent 11 days in a row together at any time. That’s no 
way to live your life.”  Another women comments on areas for improvements: 
“Stability and consistency—too hard to have a family, especially for a women.” 
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Table 19. Potential Retention Measures Generated from Respondent 
Comments: Men in YG93 and Earlier 




SWO Leadership and Culture 46% (41) 
Includes:  
Mentoring/counseling 8% (7) 
In-port Work Hours 7% (6)  
SWO Treatment of People/Mentality 8% (7) 
SWO Quality of Life/Morale 10% (9) 
Other Comments about Leadership 13% (12) 
Work Load/OPTEMPO 13% (12) 
Includes:    
Deployment/Sea Shore Rotation 9% (8) 
Work Stability/Certainty of Schedule 2% (2) 
Work Load Level Overall 2% (2) 
Family/Home/Personal Time 8% (7) 
Business Process/Organization 6% (5) 
Includes:  
Organizational focus/processes 3% (3) 
Training 2% (2) 
Career Path/Detailing 17% (15) 
Includes:   
Promotions/Accessions/FITREPs 6% (5) 
Career Tracks/Assignments 11% (10) 
Incentive Programs   10% (9) 
Includes:  
Pay (Pay, SWOCP, etc.) 10% (9) 
Misc. 1% (1) 
 
                                            
7 Total percentage is 101% due to rounding error. 
8 Men in YG93 and Earlier provided 90 issue-specific comments to Question #15. 
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Comments from men in YG93 and Earlier continue on the theme of improving 
leadership and culture and work/life balance.  This group offered numerous 
comments regarding improving mentorship, including “Establish a culture of 
mentoring vs. weeding out.” Several comments also describe the SWO community 
as having an “eat your young” and “zero defect mentality”—these and other 
respondents’ comments reiterate that the community leadership style has a negative 
influence on retention. 
Additional Respondents’ Comments Regarding SWO Retention 
In Question 16 of the survey, respondents were asked, “Any final comments 
about SWO retention?”  
Table 20. Other Retention-related Comments: Men in YG94 and Later  
Retention-related Comment Percentage9/Number of 
Comments10 
SWO Leadership and Culture 43% (29) 
Includes:  
Leadership/Mentor 24% (16) 
Morale/Mentality/QOL 19% (13) 
Work Load/OPTEMPO 9% (6) 
Family/Personal Time 10% (7) 
Business Process/Training/Organization 10% (7) 
Career Path/Detailing 6% (4) 
Rewards for Performance 6% (4) 
Pay/SWOCP 5% (3) 
Misc. (Includes positive comments) 10% (7) 
 
Additional comments from men in YG94 and Later continue to stress the 
importance and interaction between improving leadership, work/life balance and 
                                            
9 Total percentage is 99% due to rounding error. 
10 Men in YG94 and Later provided 67 issue-specific comments to Question #16. 
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SWO culture.  One respondent comments, “Improved leadership would 
improve/impact many categories (morale, workload, quality of life, fleet performance, 
mentorship, fleet readiness…)” 
Another man comments, “The reason I (and hundreds of other) SWO’s left 
are pretty similar—it’s not about the pay necessarily (although it helps) it [is] more 
due to leadership, excessive time constraints, and the stress of Navy/military life.”  
A comment from a man who separated recently (in 2003) offers a rather 
chilling opinion of SWO leadership:  
There is a bubble in the 0-6, 0-5, 0-4 ranks of 2 kinds of officer, 20% are there 
because they love to serve, are true servant leaders and everything an officer 
should be. The other 80% are not of traditional officer caliber and we are so 
short of officers in those paygrades we retain and promote them anyway.  I 
would rather, and almost did, clean my ears out with a 9mm pistol than ever 
serve under one of those officers ever again.  I loved being at sea, strike and 
surface warfare, AT/FP and most of all my division and strike team, I miss 
them all, but nothing is worth enduring the results of the poor quality of 
leadership of that 80 percent, sir/ma’am.  
Table 21. Other Retention-related Comments: Women in YG94 and Later 
Retention-related Comment Percentage11/Number of 
Comments12 
SWO Leadership and Culture 29% (10) 
Work Load/OPTEMPO 9% (3) 
Family/Personal Time 24% (8) 
Business Process/Training/Organization 3% (1) 
Rewards/Promotions/Accessions 15% (5) 
Career Path/Detailing 6% (2) 
Pay/SWOCP 9% (3) 
Misc. (Includes positive comments)  6% (2) 
 
                                            
11 Total percentage is 101% due to rounding error. 
12 Women in YG94 and Later provided 34 issue-specific comments to Question #16. 
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In addition to continuing with themes articulated by other respondents, 
women in YG94 and Later commented particularly strongly regarding the strain on 
family/personal life.  Comments from these women include: “SWO pipeline is not 
conducive to dual military family.”  “My main reason for getting out was my desire to 
not go to sea and leave my children—being a SWO and a mother is incompatible.” 
And, “Being a SWO was a great experience, but [it is] impossible for women to be at 
sea and [be] devoted wives and mothers.” 
One woman comments on how leadership directly impacts quality of life:  
As a DIVO looking at the Department Head’s lives was enough to make me 
wish to never be one. They worked longer hours than they should have. 
Some of it was because of the captain’s demands but some was because 
they thought it would look better.  The command climate should be better 
oriented to getting the job done and sending people home to their families, 
regardless of time.  
Table 22. Other Retention-related Comments: Men in YG93 and Earlier 
Retention-related Comment Percentage/Number of 
Comments13 
SWO Leadership and Culture 50% (10) 
(Includes one mentoring comment) 10% (2) 
Work Load/OPTEMPO 5% (1) 
Family/Personal Time 5% (1) 
Rewards/Promotions/Accessions 10% (2) 
Career Path/Detailing 10% (2) 
Pay/SWOCP 5% (1) 
Misc. (Includes positive comments) 15% (3) 
 
Dissatisfaction with SWO culture/morale and the work-life imbalance are 
predominant themes among comments from this group. 
                                            
13 Men in YG93 and Earlier provided 20 issue-specific comments to Question #16. 
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Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Low junior officer retention is a concern for the SWO community because the 
Navy needs a healthy retention rate to ensure an adequate number of officers 
continues on active duty to meet required manning levels at the Department Head 
level and beyond. Of particular concern is the retention of SWO women—whose 
numbers have steadily declined since the repeal of the Combat Exclusion Act in 
1994. 
The SWO lifestyle is unique, and certain aspects of it will never change; the 
lifestyle of going to sea appeals to some and not to others. Previous research 
suggests that for many who do like the lifestyle, there are family-related factors, as 
well as leadership and culture factors (including morale and lack of mentoring), that 
push both men and women out of the Navy.  Retention bonuses have not offset 
these concerns, particularly for women. Many successful women in the Navy today 
are also looking for fulfillment as wives and mothers; they “want to have it all.” The 
Navy may not be able to fully address these issues, but all of the research—
including the present study—points to factors that can be changed to impact 
retention.  
The Navy’s previous studies on retention of Surface Warfare Officers have 
gathered “intention” data from SWOs by means of surveys, focus groups, and 
interviews.  That is, the respondents offered input regarding their future plans to 
separate or stay on active duty.  This study has examined separation decisions in a 
survey of officers who have actually made the decision to leave active duty and are 
now in the IRR. This IRR survey study is the first formal research study to examine 
the separation decision already made by SWOs who have separated from active 
duty. 
During the summer of 2006, Navy Personnel Command (PERS-93)—formerly 
Naval Reserve Personnel Center (NRPC)—conducted a mandatory muster of select 
IRR members, both officers and enlisted. SWO personnel in the IRR were included. 
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The command reported that 522 actually attended the muster. The Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS), thanks to the support and cooperation from NRPC, was 
able to include a SWO IRR retention survey (see Appendix A) in the package for all 
mustering SWOs to receive, complete, and return.  NPS actually received 551 
useable surveys; there is no explanation for the discrepancy in the numbers. 
The Surface Warfare Officer Continuation Pay (SWOCP) was introduced 
beginning with YG94.  At this time, Department Head-screened SWOs were offered 
sizable additional pay if they signed a contract to complete Department Head (DH) 
School and the two subsequent DH tours. In addition to basically forcing the 
separation decision to occur before the start of Department Head School, the 
SWOCP also implied that participating officers would need to wait until completing 
their Department Head tours before again having the opportunity to separate. The 
officers in year groups prior to YG94 did not have the option of signing this type of 
contact, which might have meant their decision-making process was significantly 
different than those in later year groups.  In recognition of the fact that SWOs in 
YG94 and later had a different retention decision-making environment than those in 
YG93 and earlier, the survey analysis in this report separates the respondents into 
two different Year group categories—those in YG93 and Earlier and those in YG94 
and Later. All responses are also analyzed by gender. Of the total 551 respondents, 
65 percent were in YG94 and Later (70 percent of that group were men), and 35 
percent were in YG93 and Earlier (93 percent were men, which meant that the 
number of women was so small—10—that in most cases the Earlier women’s data 
were not analyzed). 
The demographics of the two year groupings at the time of the IRR muster 
differed in many ways. The men in YG93 and Earlier are older, more senior, stayed 
on active duty longer than the later group, and fewer of them chose the IRR to avoid 
the risk of being recalled.  More of these men are married with dependent children 
and have unemployed spouses.  Thus, we would expect their separation decisions 
to be different from the men and women in YG94 and later. We would also expect to 
be more interested in the perspectives of the younger group in that their experiences 
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and perceptions should be more representative of the current environment for junior 
SWO officers. Oddly enough, however, the data actually show more similarities than 
differences between the two groups.   
What Influenced Survey Respondents to Leave Active Duty? 
Survey respondents were asked to identify the influence of 28 factors (see 
Table 8) on their decisions to separate from active duty.  The percentages were 
recorded for those who said a factor’s influence was a “Very Strong Influence” or 
“Strong Influence.” The other choices were “Minor Influence” or “No Influence.” 
These factors can be divided into one of three categories:1) family/personal time; 2) 
leadership—factors that either senior Navy leadership or immediate leaders can 
control such as morale, culture, sexual discrimination, or hours in port; and 3) 
benefits, some guaranteed (e.g., retirement pay), and some not, such as graduate 
education or a lateral transfer. However, there is overlap among some of these 
factors.  For example, work hours in port is widely reported as a leadership factor—
senior leaders keeping people longer than necessary, or “Navy Leadership” putting 
too many requirements on ships.  On the other hand, are hours while deployed hard 
requirements or the result of leader preferences?  Work load/hours in port are 
counted as a leadership item in this report.  Similarly, recognition could be seen as a 
function of leadership or as a benefit; it was counted here as a benefit. 
Data were tabulated to show the percentage of respondents that rated each 
factor as a “Very strong” or “Strong” influence on their decision to leave. There are 
seven family/personal factors, and the ratings for four of these factors are higher 
than any of the others on the lists for both men and women in both year groupings. If 
the factors are listed highest to lowest and divided into thirds, the remaining 
family/personal factors are in the second third of the lists. While rated similarly by 
men and women, the ability to start a family and balancing one’s career with a 
spouse’s are more influential items for women than for men. When the data are 
analyzed only for “Very strong” influences, more of the women rated family factors 
as having been the strongest influences. 
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There are 10 leadership items on the survey, and these appear in the first and 
second thirds of the list for both men and women. Having a mentor is slightly more 
important to women than to men. However, regardless of the gender involved, 
studies have shown that mentoring has a strong, positive impact on retention in the 
military. 
 Last, there are 11 benefit items; with a few exceptions, these items appear in 
the bottom third of the lists.  Some exceptions appeared in the middle of the lists, 
however. For men, these were amount of total military pay, funded graduate 
education, and promotion opportunities; for women, these were the two graduate 
education items. It is worth noting that among the benefit items in the bottom third of 
this list both men and women place the bonuses very low on the list of factors that 
caused them to separate. These factors placed in the bottom four of the ratings list 
for women and the bottom six for men. 
 Conclusion 1:  
Family-related factors are the top-rated influences on decision to leave 
active duty; this holds true for both men and women and older vs. 
younger year groups. Women felt more strongly than men about the 
influence some of these factors had on the decision to leave active 
duty. This supports data gathered in other studies based on intentions 
to leave or stay.   
 Conclusion 2: 
Leadership and culture issues have a strong influence on retention and 
probably cannot be offset by monetary incentives in most cases. 
 Conclusion 3: 
Monetary incentives have less influence on retention than family or 
leadership factors. “Total military pay” was more important to men than 
to women, but still placed lower on the list than many other factors that 
caused men to leave active duty.  
 Conclusion 4: 
Mentoring is a positive retention factor for both men and women.  Not 
surprisingly, a greater percentage of YG94 and Later women (17%) 
than men in that group (2%) and in YG93 and Earlier (0%) rate 
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“Existence of sexual discrimination” as a very strong or strong 
influence on separation.  Crawford et al. (2006) had a similar finding, 
with some women reporting that they have felt marginalized by either 
poor male leadership, well-intentioned but unaware male leadership, or 
simply the small numbers of other women as role models and mentors 
in the community. 
 Conclusion 5:  
Discrimination against women—sometimes subtle and sometimes not-
so-subtle—and other complex gender issues still exist and can affect 
retention. 
Do Survey Respondents Regret Leaving Active Duty and What 
Would Make Them Consider Returning? 
The majority of YG94 and Later men (82%) and women (81%) and men 
YG93 and Earlier (72%) do not regret leaving active duty. Their feelings about 
improvements that might lead them to return to active duty were assessed by having 
them respond to 17 factors with “Yes,” “No,” or “Maybe.”  The factor most frequently 
rated “Yes” for all three groups was “Overall time spent away from home” (17% of 
men and 28% of women), followed closely by a cluster around “Work load hours in 
port,” “Certainty of work schedule,” Geographic stability,” “Ability to lateral transfer to 
another community,” “Quality of leadership in the SWO community,” and “Morale in 
the SWO community.” Improvements in monetary factors (i.e., SWOCP, military pay, 
and a bonus), as well as indirect monetary factors (i.e., retirement and medical 
benefits), have relatively little influence in enticing both men and women 
respondents to return to active duty. When “Maybe” responses were included in the 
highest rated item, the percentages who would consider returning jumped to 37 
percent for men and 52 percent for women. 
More women than men indicated they would consider returning to active duty, 
and women rated leadership and morale closer to the top of their lists (second and 
third, respectively) than did the men.  Further, this is a sizeable proportion. For 
example, 25 percent of women said “Yes,” they would consider returning to active 
duty if changes were made to SWO leadership.  Another 15 percent said “Maybe” to 
this same item. 
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The previous study in this series found that women outside of the military who 
left organizations such as law firms wanted to return to their careers later. The fact 
that the women in this study do not regret leaving active duty is not necessarily 
inconsistent with the possibilities of their rejoining should the opportunity arise after 
changes were made.  
 Conclusion 6:  
The majority of respondents do not regret the decision to leave active 
duty, but more women than men might consider returning to active 
duty. Changes that would serve as incentives for women to return 
concerned family and leadership issues; monetary factors were seen 
as less influential. 
What One Thing Could Be Done to Improve SWO Retention? 
The last area of the survey asked for open-ended comments to the question, 
“What ONE thing should be done to improve SWO retention?” 
Table 23. Categories of Open-ended Comments on One Thing That Could Be 
Changed to Improve SWO Retention, by Year Groupings  
(Percentages) 
 YG94 and 
Later Men 




Leadership and Culture 36 49 46 
Family/Personal Time 7 10 8 
Work Load/Optempo 16 10 13 
Business Processes 10 3 5 
Career Path/Detailing 14 18 17 
Incentive Programs 12 5 10 
Misc. 6 5 1 
 
It is not surprising from the data shown above that leadership, culture, and 
morale items are items that the respondents commented on most frequently. 
However, the list is slightly different from the factors that respondents rated earlier 
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for the influence on their separation decisions. The factors shown in Table 23 differ 
because respondents are singling them out as factors that could be changed. 
Whether or not all of these things can be easily changed is another matter, but the 
data should serve as a focus for serious consideration by the community for 
retention of officers now on active duty.  
 Conclusion 7: 
The fact that IRR members can identify changes that would make them 
consider returning to active duty is a positive finding for the community 
as senior leadership considers retention issues for active duty officers. 
 Conclusion 8:  
Leadership and culture are at the top of the list of things that should be 
changed to improve SWO retention. 
 While this survey included some items that should be changed or reworded if 
it is conducted again in the future, it presents solid evidence that the SWO 
community can make changes that should positively affect retention. The strong 
responses to negative leadership practices, which in turn affect some of the family-
related factors, are given weight both by other studies and by the agreement 
between men and women/younger and older year groups. The most unambiguous 
survey items are those relating to monetary incentives and benefits, and those were 
consistently at the bottom of the lists. The evidence upholds the statement heard 
many times in interviews and focus groups with SWOs in previous studies, “It’s not 
about the money.”  
Given the low impact of monetary incentives, the inability of the community to 
change some of the family-related factors due to the nature of the job, and the non-
appeal of selection and classification solutions discussed earlier, the answer to the 
question of where the Navy turns now has to be “to leadership practices.” 
Additionally, in the words cited earlier by Parcell (2007), “There may be little an 
employer can do to change work-life imbalance, but if it is related to policies, […] the 
Navy needs to minimize inhospitable workplace practices and consider personnel 
management policies that can provide for a better work/life balance.”  
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 Conclusion 9:  
While it is not clear why we have put so much emphasis on monetary 
incentives for retention to-date while excluding most other issues 
(except for recent initiatives involving 360-degree feedback and life-
work balance), this study and others suggest that the time is right to 
consider implementing changes that address non-monetary issues. Put 
very simply, since there are things the Navy can’t change, it should 
work on some things that it can. 
The following recommendations identify initiatives that can influence the 
retention decisions of both men and women. 
1. Analyze 360-degree feedback data available at The Center for Naval 
Leadership to identify specific areas of leadership that require 
emphasis in training and education. 
2. Should initial analyses of the 360-degree feedback data support it, 
expand the use of such feedback to communities in the Navy not 
currently using it.  The automated 360 program as part of the SMARTS 
system is inexpensive and may have the potential to improve 
leadership more than training interventions.  For example, it is known 
that when leaders derail, it is often due to some fatal flaw known by 
others but not to them because they did not get the proper feedback. 
While subordinates rarely give such feedback to seniors, 360-degree 
feedback provides a vehicle for autonomous input. 
3. Review needs for leadership training at various points in the continuum 
for SWO officers.  This effort has already been started by the present 
authors, and findings suggest that Department Head training is the 
most important point for changes because Department Heads will have 
the most impact on Division Officers. Such training should explicitly 
address the relationship between leadership and retention—both the 
positive and the negative practices and associated outcomes.  For 
example, senior officers must become more aware of the enormous 
impact they can have on retention when they make their people work 
unnecessarily long hours while they are in port or on shore tours. 
4. Strengthen knowledge of mentoring as an important retention and 
developmental factor. This should take place at all points in the 
leadership continuum. Senior officers cannot be “too busy to mentor.” 
5. Strengthen knowledge of men leading women at key points in the 
training continuum. (This was a recommendation in the first report in 
this series.) 
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6. Analyze costs and benefits of detailing more women to fewer ships.  
Focus on assigning women as Department Heads to ships that have 
women on board. (This, too, was a recommendation from the first 
report in this series.) 
7. Continue and accelerate (where possible) all life-work balance 
initiatives such as geographic stability, telecommuting, and off- and on-
ramps. This research shows that these items are important to both 
men and women. 
8. Revise this survey and administer it to other Navy IRR communities.  
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Appendix B. Demographics of Survey 
Respondents 
Paygrade 
Table 1. Respondents (YG94 and Later) by Paygrade and Gender 
(Percentage) 
  0-1 0-1E14 0-2 0-2E 0-3 0-3E 0-4 0-4E 0-5 No 
Response
Men 0 0 5 1 74 2 14 1 1 1 
Women 1 0 17 0 76 0 3 1 1 1 
 
 The predominant representation among respondents in paygrades 0-3 
and 0-4 likely corresponds with the fact that the majority of SWOs 
would have reached their first separation decision as 0-3s and the next 
separation decision as 0-4s. 
Table 2. Respondents (YG93 and Earlier) by Paygrade and Gender 
(Percentage/Number of Respondents) 
 0-1 0-1E 0-2 0-2E 0-3 0-3E 0-4 0-4E 0-5 No 
Response
Men 0 0 1 0 5 1 55 1 37 1 
Women15 0 0 0 0 10 (1) 10 (1) 60 (6) 0 20 (2) 0 
 
 As compared to the 395 respondents in the more recent year groups, 
the 156 respondents in YG93 and Earlier are much more senior in 
rank.  A fairly low percentage of these respondents are in ranks of 0-3 
or lower. 
                                            
14 “0-1E,” “0-2E,” etc., denotes that the officers hold the stated rank and are prior enlisted. 
15 Throughout this report, actual numbers of respondents (frequencies) are presented in parentheses 
next to the percentage for women in YG93 or earlier. 
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Martial Status 




Married Divorced Widowed No 
Response 
Men 37 59 3 0 1 
Women 30 67 2 0 1 
 
 Over half of the men and about two-thirds of the women in these later 
year groups are married. 
Table 4. Marital Status of Respondents in YG93 and Earlier by Gender 
(Percentage/Number of Respondents) 
 Never 
Married 
Married Divorced Widowed No 
Response 
Men 12 82 4 0 1 
Women 20 (2) 80 (8) 0 0 0 
All 13 82 4 0 1 
 
 As compared to respondents in YG94 and Later, a greater percentage 
of respondents in YG93 and Earlier are married. As noted earlier, the 
number of women in this year group is too small for meaningful 
comparisons. 
Spouse’s Employment Status (If Respondent is Married) 
Table 5. Spouse’s Employment Status for YG94 and Later by Gender 
(Percentage) 








Men  3 38 13 6 41 
Women 34 28 5 1 32 
 
 - 65 - 
 A much higher percentage of women have spouses on active duty. 
 A lower percentage of women have spouses who are unemployed. 
Table 6. Spouse’s Employment Status for YG93 and Earlier by Gender 
(Percentage/Number of Respondents) 










Male  2 32 34 14 17 1 
Women 10 (1) 70 (7) 0 0 20 (2) 0 
 
 The percentage of spouses not employed is higher among 
respondents in these earlier year groups than among those in the later 
year groups. This may be a function of this group being older (see 
Table 17) and of a generation in which fewer wives worked outside the 
home than in the later group. 
Number of Dependent Children 
Table 7. Number of Dependent Children for YG94 and Later by Gender 
(Percentage) 




Men 70 13 14 2 
Women 72 16 12 0 
 
 Most respondents do not have dependent children. 
 This finding is not consistent with the large number of Navy personnel 
who say they are leaving to start a family, unless this group has not yet 
had sufficient time to do that.  
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Table 8. Number of Dependent Children for YG93 and Earlier by Gender 
(Percentage/Number of Respondents) 




Men 21 8 69 1 
Women 10 (1) 20 (2) 70 (7) 0 
 
 Of respondents in these earlier year groups, the majority has multiple 
dependent children. 
 This group may differ from the other because they are older and have 
had time to start a family. 
Commissioning Source 
Table 9. Commissioning Source of YG94 and Later by Gender 
(Percentage) 






Men 29 47 17 0 2 3 3 
Women 37 51 7 0 3 1 2 
 
 Among respondents in the later year groups, the top source of 
commissioning is NROTC, followed by USNA, and lastly, by OCS.  
This order is the same for men and women. 
Table 10. Commissioning Source of YG93 and Earlier by Gender 
(Percentage/Number of Respondents) 






Men 34 38 23 1 1 3 1 
Women 30 (3) 20 (2) 40 (4) 0 0 0 10 (1) 
 
 Among respondents in the earlier year groups, as with the later year 
groups, the largest commissioning source is NROTC, followed by 
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USNA, then OCS.  However, in the earlier year groups, there is a 
higher percentage of respondents commissioned through OCS than in 
the later year groups.  
 The number of newly commissioned officers that flows through OSC 
varies year to year, as OCS is considered a sort of “valve” for 
community managers; each year, after determining the level of new 
accessions from the two primary sources of commissioning—USNA 
and NROTC—BUPERS accepts the remaining required amount of 
future officers needed through the OCS channel. 
Year Group 
Table 11. Year Group of YG94 and Later by Gender16 
(Percentage) 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Men 7 5 5 3 15 31 18 9 5 2 0 0 
Women 2 1 3 1 15 28 18 12 12 8 0 1 
 
 The biggest year groups are YG98, YG99 and YG00.  These three 
year groups account for 64% of men, 61% of women. 
 Respondents in year groups after YG02 would not yet have completed 
four years of active service at the time of this survey.  They likely were 
exceptions to the four- or five-year active service obligation. 
Table 12. Year Group of YG93 and Earlier by Gender 
(Percentage/Number of Respondenets) 
  198317 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Men 8 9 12 12 13 9 5 5 6 8 13 
Women18 17 (1) 0 0 0 17 (1) 17 (1) 33 (2) 0 17 (1) 0 0 
 The biggest year groups are YG85, YG86, YG87 and YG93.  These 
four year groups account for 50% of the respondents in YG93 and 
Earlier. 
                                            
16 Table 12 does not reflect non-responses to the Year group question. 
17 Includes respondents in YG83 and earlier. 
18 Total is 101% due to rounding error. 
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Birth Year 




70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 No 
Response
Men 4 1 8 7 5 6 8 19 20 9 9 1 1 1 
Women 3 2 3 1 2 3 4 18 24 12 12 11 6 0 
 
 The most prevalent birth years are 1976 and 1977.  Respondents born 
in these years would have been 29-30 years old at the time of the 2006 
IRR muster, and the whole range is 25-37 years. 
Table 14. Birth Year of YG93 and Earlier by Gender 
(Percentage) 
 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 No 
Response
Men 7 8 16 19 6 8 7 4 5 4 8 6 1 1 
Women 30(3) 0 0 0 10(1) 20(2) 10(1) 10(1) 0 10(1) 10(1) 0 0 0 
 
 Among respondents in the earlier year groups, the birth years range 
from 1960 to 1972.  The most prevalent birth years are 1962 and 1963.  
Respondents born in these two years would have been 43-44 years 
old at the time of the 2006 IRR muster, and the whole range is 41-53 
years old. 
Career Stage at Separation 














Men 10 69 2 2 0 11 6 
Women 8 75 2 1 0 10 5 
 
 - 69 - 
Figure 1. Career Stage at Separation—YG 1994 and Later by Gender 
(Percentage) 
 
 The majority of respondents separated after their Division Officer tours 
but before starting Department Head School.  This largely corresponds 
to the separation window of opportunity between the end of the MSO 
and the beginning of the SWOCP commitment (Department Head 
School).  
 There are few differences between the patterns of men and women. 
Seventy-nine percent of the men and 83 percent of the women 
separated by the end of the DIVO tours. 
Table 16. Career Stage at Separation of YG93 and Earlier by Gender 













Men 3 56 15 9 2 9 6 
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Figure 2. Career Stage at Separation—YG 1993 and Earlier by Gender 
(Percentage) 
 
 As compared to respondents in the later year group category, a 
smaller percentage of respondents in YG93 and Earlier (59 percent for 
the men) separated after the Division Officer tours, and a greater 
percentage separated later in their SWO career.  However, by far the 
most prevalent time for separation remains after the DIVO tours for 
both YG categories.  
Had a Job Offer when Left Active Duty 




Yes No No 
Response
Men 47 48 5 
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 Approximately one-half of the men had a job offer when they separated 
from active duty, while closer to one-third of the women had a job offer 
at that time. 
Table 18. Job Offer when Separated for YG93 and Earlier by Gender 
(Percentage/Number of Respondents) 
 Yes No No 
Response
Men 52 45 3 
Women 40 (4) 50 (5) 10 (1) 
 
 Roughly one-half of the respondents in the later year groups had job 
offers when they left active duty. 
Notable Differences of the Two Year Group Categories: 
As is discussed earlier in this report, the majority of respondents in YG94 and 
Later are in YG98-00; thus, these respondents would mostly have separated around 
2002-2005.  This survey was administered in the summer of 2006, so respondents in 
YG94 and Later represent a sample of fairly recently separated SWOs.  
The majority of respondents in YG93 and Earlier are an older group. The 
majority of them are in YG85-87 and YG93, and most of them separated during the 
1989-1992 and 1997-98 timeframe—considerably earlier than the time of 
administration of the summer 2006 survey.  Additionally, this group stayed on active 
duty longer than the later group. 
The active duty SWO “environment” is comprised of many factors, including: 
current naval policies, operational tempo demands,  career opportunities available to 
women officers, SWOCP contracts, naval leadership trends, and many more. As a 
result, the active duty SWO environment at the time of separation for those 
respondents in the later year groups is likely much more representative of the 
current environment for SWO junior officers than was the separation-era 
environment for respondents in the earlier year-group category.  One should 
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consider this perspective when reviewing the retention-related survey results in this 
report.  
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